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Medieval studies has it all. At the end of the twentieth century, whatever one wishes 
to explore, one can find it adumbrated or more plainly available in die middle ages. 
Nor does one have to listen (as I have done with pleasure and profit over the years) 
to that committed teacher and scholar, Douglas Wurtele, in order to appreciate this. 
I was assured of that by Matthew P. MacDiarmid when I was an undergraduate at 
Aberdeen. When I went to Oxford as a graduate student, the endless potential and 
compelling actualities of medieval studies were even more palpable than at Aber­
deen, especially for someone intending to work in the nineteenth century. However, 
the Aberdeen all proved to be different from the Oxford all, most notably in the 
place granted to the so-called Scottish Chaucerians in a decidedly Anglocentric 
scheme of things. And this conflicted sense of all—what it is and who gets to define 
it—helped open the door for me on what has in the last two decades been a site for 
some of the most important and intermittendy-productive debates in literary studies 
and in the humanities more generally.1
My early experience in two ancient universities, one reasserting its Scottishness 
and the other imperturbably English, as well as impressively international in its grad­
uate student body, points to the fact that questions of canonicity derive from and fre- 
quendy intensify the tensions, unsettlements, and partisanships which constitute the 
literary field in principia, although symptoms of difference are articulated in histori­
cally specific, contingent ways in different settings, in different versions of the field
established, traversed, and exceeded by the energies of incursion and entitlement. In 
principia indeed. The biblical distinction between the canonical and the apocryphal 
will always have some bearing on the understanding and academic management of 
the literary canon, though its precise bearing will change over time not only with the 
fluctuating authority of the Bible (and other sacred texts) but also in response to the 
imbricated, analogous distinctions between dialect and language, differing legal sys­
tems, contrasting gender politics and levels of cultural and economic development, 
and the place of the individual or original author in the production and preservation 
of a national literature and national imaginary.2
What I intend to do in this paper is to stage a return of sorts to some of those 
tensions I encountered in my student days, and to do so from the vantage-point of 
someone who has over the years taught Chaucer’s and Shakespeare’s works on the 
Troilus theme but never the one closest to my heart, namely Henryson’s Testament of 
Cresseid. And I will make this return from the perspective of teaching, enlisting the 
desire of the teacher to experiment with a teachable text from an earlier period after 
my own long march through nineteenth-century studies and critical and cultural 
theory. The notion of the teachable text has the virtue of taking us direcdy to the 
centre of current debates about both teaching and textuality and I will now attempt a 
summary characterisation of teaching before testing my claims against the possibili­
ties o f teaching Troilus otherwise.
At each stage in what follows I will be guided by the complementary convic­
tions that we better teach Troilus, otherwise those materials will fall into neglect; and 
if we do not teach Troilus otherwise, in new ways and new registers, then we will be 
teaching to virtually empty classrooms, with all the ominous implications that attend 
such enrolment patterns in the contemporary university.
Teachability
In my view, teachability begs to be connected not to some transhistorical, transcul- 
turally Socratic or priesdy essence or gift but rather to the question of how university 
teaching is currendy valued. In this regard one might point to three major factors 
that shape or threaten to shape what we understand and do in the name of teaching. 
First there is the concern, fuelled in significant measure by the 1991 Smith Report
commissioned by the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, that the 
reward structures of universities and the selfish inclinations of a careerist professo­
riate conspire to devalue teaching and privilege research (Findlay). Second, and more 
recendy, the activity of university teaching in regional and national contexts has 
come under threat from transnational market forces drawing on the cult of celebrity 
so prominent in a numbingly presentist American culture and its global clones and 
surrogates. These forces are now acting in combination with new information tech­
nologies which have the ability to transform distance education and university access 
so that competitive advantage and a predominantly one-way brain drain can effec­
tively complete a process of neo-colonialism by returning to colonised peoples 
commodified knowledge marketed as modernity, quality, and consumer freedom in 
order to enhance dependency and profit while avoiding exposure as cultural 
dumping and defoliation (Miller 97; Willinski 32-33; Ki-Zerbo). Third, the coercive 
and reductive agency of the free and rapidly-globalising market clearly entails the 
construction of the student as no citizen in the making but rather as a wired 
consumer surfing for the source, that ultimate expert on this or the other hot topic 
who has packaged something as legal academic tender, offering through spinoff 
companies and institutional development and university research offices vicarious or 
virtual mastery in self-contained units bearing an immediately-recognisable brand- 
name.3 Technohype about piping the best into the hinterland from Harvard or the 
University of California has made an impression even on Dr. Marc Renaud, Presi­
dent of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, who 
warned an academic audience recently that they must act creatively and decisively if 
they wish to avoid being made redundant or being reduced to technical facilitators 
for intellectual content originating elsewhere and designed to dominate Canadian 
and other foreign consumption of advanced knowledge. Such action, he held, 
involved a move from the ivory tower to the market square because today the market 
rules, and humanists and social scientists can and should adapt to that reality. Dr. 
Renaud’s is not so much a counsel of despair as a necessary wake-up call. How can 
we do things differendy, pushing adaptation away from servility and fatalism, and 
towards complexity and creativity and critique?
How teaching is perceived and practised in the humanities is particularly 
pertinent, linked as the humanities too often are to accusations of irrelevance or to 
the abductive agenda of narrow or coercive instrumentality. Academic humanists
generally do more teaching than their colleagues in the sciences and social sciences, 
and that teaching seems currendy to be valued more as training than as an education 
that endures in ways all the more important for their relative indeterminacy and 
oblique or deferred payoff.4 Anyone teaching earlier historical periods will be 
regarded in some quarters as teaching that which is no longer teachable or worth 
teaching. At this conjuncture, the personal example of teacher-scholars like Douglas 
Wurtele, showing how a medievalist can be an inspiring teacher and academic leader, 
are invaluable and heartening. But we need to rely on more than individual examples 
to make a compelling humanist case, and I would like to offer here an illustration of 
the view that teaching is an appropriately labour-intensive process for instructors and 
students alike, a process with a place for the committed generalist as well as the 
specialist to wrest interactivity and critical adaptivity back, at least in part, from its 
new and often subdy sedative locations in electronic media, and to do so in the name 
of the kinds of reading and exchange that enhance economic agency while nour­
ishing an engaged and critical citizenry. Aligning ourselves primarily—though not 
exclusively—with teaching seems the best way for humanists to talk about the social 
transfer of cultural knowledge. But what should we add to our teaching methods and 
range, and why?
Surviving (with) The Canon
As my opening remarks indicated and my subheading confirms, any canon is more a 
living site than a mausoleum where the only signs of change are the occasional addi­
tion of a newly-discovered work by one of the longtime residents, or the creeping 
patina of academic commentary evident on the surface of the objects or texts gath­
ered and preserved there. The forms of life the literary canon promotes and nour­
ishes connect intimately with cultural imperialism insofar as that imperialism 
represents a kind of hit-parade offering assurances of quality and hierarchy while 
connecting conveniendy to that imperialist economy that seeks to manage civilisa­
tion in the interests of a small part of the so-called developed world (Tomlinson). 
Canonical status meant and continues to mean that something or someone is a part 
of that which is enduring and exportable: that whose value, in a word, can be 
counted on, invested in, and extended to new markets. How this reality is read and 
responded to is, of course, another matter.
One can see these determinations of literary and aesthetic value at work with 
something like the Troilus theme so suggestively treated in Piero Boitani’s recent col­
lection of essays. The title and introduction claim Troilus for European Tragedy, a 
move that helps locate these materials firmly in self-sustaining high culture before 
complicating the story in relation to gender, court culture, and national aspirations. 
Troilus’ post-Homeric toehold in cultural memory is confirmed and dramatically 
extended when he acquires a new lease on life via his coupling with that 
Briseis-Cressida who springs—as if in parthenogenesis—from the freshly-fantasising 
cranium of Benoît de Sainte-Maure with the Roman de Troie of the second half o f the 
twelfth century. As Roberto Antonelli argues, Troilus’ transformation from military 
cipher and war fodder to an exemplar of romantic subjectivity requires the invention 
of Briseis, with the result that his new independence is also a new form of depen­
dency (21). Even if, as Antonelli claims, courtly love is a vehicle for male narcissism, 
there is still the need of a reflective medium by which to complete the circuit of 
self-absorption and a doubling effect made available as source and reflection, origina­
tion and derivation, sun and moon, and so on. This reflective need marks a gap or 
interruption in a larger process of overdetermination wherein contradictions prove 
irreducible beyond a certain point and Briseis, in order to be the deserving object/ 
conduit/return-to-itself of male desire, can be desired by other men as well as Troilus 
and can call on prudent behaviour (“sage con tenement” Roman 5284; Antonelli 23) 
in negotiating the hazards of war and male possessiveness. This is a form of gendered 
sagesse that nonetheless fails to keep her from the appearance and reality of incon­
stancy.
The libidinal economy described by Benoît will strain for fixity and perfect 
equivalence but be obliged to accommodate change. This process expresses itself in a 
move repeated (though each time with important differences) by Chaucer, Henry- 
son, and Shakespeare, and also by those who would freeze the literary canon.
Mout fu amee e mout amot,
Mais sis corages li chanjot;
E si ert el mout vergondose,
Simple e ausmoniere e pitose.
[ She was greatly loved, and she herself loved greatly, but her heart was not 
constant. Nonetheless she was very timid, modest, generous, and compas­
sionate (translation by Antonelli 23).]
The poised reciprocity of the first line quoted—passive and then suddenly active, 
beloved and loving—is countered by the ominous qualification and quasi-passivity of 
the second where her “corages” seem to take on a life of their own somewhere 
between modem coeur and courage, the reflexive and the transitive.5 The jolt deliv­
ered by this line cannot be fully dispelled by the supplementary enumeration of 
apparent virtues, because the logic of the supplement functions to defer indefinitely 
precisely such restitution. I am not qualified to answer the question Antonelli sets 
himself after quoting these four lines of verse: “But why invent a story such as that of 
Troilus and Briseis? And why Benoît in particular?” However, as a self-entitled gen­
eralist, I would make the relationship and its various textual treatments all the more 
teachable because ultimately mysterious in origin and multiply conflicted over time.
Chaucer’s Troilus follows Benoît quite closely in describing Criseyde, but with 
crucial differences:
She sober was, eek simple, and wys withal,
The best ynorrished ek that myghte be,
And godly of hire speche in general,
Charitable, estadich, lusty and free;
Ne never-mo ne lakked hire pite\
Tendre-herted, slydynge of corage;
But trewely, I kan nat telle hir age. (V.820-26)6
We are here with the intertextual Cresseid, no doubt, but in the robust sense of that 
term which cannot be confined to deliberate echoes and demonstrable influences. 
Chaucer’s rendering of Benoit’s “Mais si corages li chanjoit” as “slydyng of corage” 
comes after many lines of brilliant complication of his heroine’s personality and pre­
dicament. He does not use Benoit’s prosodic tactics o f reciprocity, disruption, and 
recovery. Instead, Chaucer points to her physical well-being before compressing the 
tensions between fidelity and fallibility into a single line whose second half looks in 
several directions at once: back in sound and suggestion of something surreptitious 
to Troilus “slynk[ing]” into his own bed after his first night spent with Criseyde 
(III.1525); and forward to the unsettling observation by the narrator, after Criseyde 
looks longingly back from the Greek camp to Troy and vows she will soon accom­
pany Troilus where he wishes to go: “But god it wot, er fully monthe two, / She was 
fui fer fro that entencioun! / For both Troilus and Troie town / Shal knotteles
throughout hire herte slide” (V.766-69, emphasis added). So much for tugging on 
the heart strings! Chaucer seems to be playing on Latin cor ¡cordis and English “cord” 
as he predicts a knotless dénouement for his great poem: the hero and her former 
home are reduced to transient, smoothed-out sections on the thread of her life. As 
her “corage” had floated in the congested field of medieval possibilities (Robinson 
cites for “corage” in his glossary: “heart, mind; nature, disposition; desire, will, 
ardour; courage, encouragement” ), so her sliding moves from inconstancy to a more 
encompassing lubricity in which her own physical movement is replicated in the 
movement of Criseyde’s emotions and erstwhile attachments. Those feelings had, 
after all, been so “depe in-with my herte grave” (HI.1508). One may note not only 
the ironic reversal signalled by the shift from the process of engraving to that of spin­
ning or sowing, but also that unencumbered movement which she had earlier likened 
to the unencumbered flow of water in the river Simois through Troy and down to 
the sea (IV.1548-1554). Within a patriarchal economy, female protestations of fidel­
ity undermine themselves always, creating an effect of sparsity or abundance but 
always with a worrisome excess or internal dissonance. The activity of reading (or 
being read to) brings out connections and crises in this love story, but can never 
finally fix Criseyde’s motivations and responsibility inside or outside herself, or even 
in some stable mix of external circumstance and personal disposition. A harmonist 
hermeneutic, whether offered by the specialist or the generalist, can deal with Chau­
cer’s poem only by doing violence to its contradictions, and hence doing dispropor­
tionate violence to its heroine.7
It might seem that Robert Henryson does what Benoît and Chaucer fail or 
refuse to do: namely, apportion blame to Cresseid on the basis of a confident and 
unflinching diagnosis of her character and state of mind. Henryson’s decision to con­
centrate on the heroine, to the virtual exclusion of Troilus, may seem to accord her 
even more autonomy than Chaucer grants her, but this concentration is not a sign of 
enhanced respect for her so much as it is the grounding of tragedy in the protago­
nist’s progressive isolation and self-examination on the way to a fuller moral account­
ability. In giving us something of a sequel or supplement to Chaucer’s poem,8 
Henryson positions the fictional text on which he claims to rely between the author­
itative and the freshly fabricated. However, he emphasises the term “inventioun” 
(67) as distinguishing his source for Cresseid’s “fatall destenie” (62), interestingly 
the first recorded use of this term in a literary sense in Scots (Jack and Rozendall 66).
This fresh application affords him the liberty to specify his eponymous heroine’s fate 
in some detail beyond the limits o f his sources, but this liberty of invention also puts 
the poet’s discretion in question as unattractive, unduly severe, even wanton in its 
cruelty.9 The overdeterminations at play in the site of male narcissism represented by 
Briseis/Criseyde have been relocated in the psyche of the poet and in the surrogate 
maker of the book he purports (conventionally enough) to be reading from.
Henryson’s Cresseid is never connected to “corage,” sliding or otherwise; that 
term is employed here only to denote a diminished capacity or lack (“doif and deid”) 
in the aged (32). Cresseid is favoured instead with the following remarkable treat­
ment:
Quha wait gif all that Chaucer wrait was trew?
Nor I wait nocht gif this narratioun 
Be authoreist, or fenyeit of the new 
Be sum poeit, throw his inventioun 
Maid to report the lamentatioun 
And wofull end of this lustie Cresseid,
And quhat distres scho thoillit, and quhat deid. (64-70)
This is a wonderful moment in which the anxiety of influence causes the successor 
poet to place his own contribution under the double and seemingly contradictory 
protection of authoritative tradition and fresh innovation. A reasonable doubt about 
Chaucer’s veracity creates the space for Henryson’s poetic record of female suffering. 
The double burden of invenire—as the discovering of the pre-existent and the bring­
ing into being of the hitherto non-existent—seems weighted more towards the latter 
sense, but imaginative autonomy is accompanied by accountability summoned 
swiftly to our judgment of the redactor/inventor of the following two stanzas:
Quhen Diomeid had all his appetyte,
And mair, fulfillit of this fair ladie,
Upon ane-uther he set his haill delyte,
And send to hir ane lybell of repudie,
And hir excludit fra his companie.
Than desolait scho walkit up and doun,
And sum men sayis into the court commoun.
0  fair Cresseid, the flour and A per se
Of Troy and Greece, how was thow fortunait!
To change in filth all thy feminitie,
And be with fleschlie lust sa maculait,
And go amang the Greikis air and lait 
Sa giglotlike, takand thy foull plesance!
1 have pietie thow suld fall sic mischance! (71-84)
Henryson moves his heroine in short order from pathetic dependency to promis­
cuous agency. The lady whom Diomeid had “Ressavit” (44) a few lines previously is 
now rejected formally and publicly, as the reader’s sympathy inclines towards 
Cresseid—while still being impeded in that movement by the detail of supersatiety 
(“and mair”). This note of excess implies both that it takes little time to exhaust what 
this woman has to offer and also that Diomeid showed a measure of restr aint or even 
generosity in delaying the redirection of his sexual attentions longer than the situa­
tion warranted. The sense of Cresseid’s accelerating moral decline is held off for a 
moment by the softening of certainty into rumour (“sum men sayis”), but there is no 
mistaking the punitive zeal of what follows. The poet constructs his heroine as the 
only-too-compliant object of male desire and then as something even more reprehen­
sible, a desiring subject in her own right taking her own pleasures, rather than being 
taken for the pleasure of a noble lover. What does a (fallen) woman want, one may 
ask? And after the underscoring of this version of de casibus, what credence can we 
give to the poet’s “pietie” for what she has somehow to endure as well as enjoy?
The authorised yet inventive space that Henryson has created for himself now 
fills with contradictions enough “and mair,” so much so that neither the later judg­
ment of the gods nor the poet’s remarkably imaginative rendering of her last encoun­
ter with Troilus can rescue Cresseid fully from confusion:
Yit nevertheles, quhatever men deme or say 
In scornefull langage of thy brukkilnes,
I sail excuse, als far furth as I may,
Thy womanheid, thy wisdome and fairnes—
The [quhilk] Fortoun hes put to sic distres 
As hir plesit, and nathing throw the gilt 
Of the, throw wickit langage to be spilt. (85-91)
Henryson’s bitter apostrophe now turns to insisting on his own linguistic precision 
and moral fastidiousness. He positions himself between both loose talk of looseness 
and the implicit authority of an informed conscience, the explicit inclination of an 
implacable Fortune. And so, substantially pre-empted by both rumour and fate, 
what will the poet’s conscience allow? What is this womanhood, wisdom, and fair­
ness which he wishes still to “excuse” ? How can all three be excusable and Cresseid 
still guilty? How can all three be culpable, whether through insufficiency or malfunc­
tion, except through the eyes of an aggravated misogyny which must translate a gen­
eralised womanhood immediately into parts o f the female body and components of 
male desire? One form of feminised pleasure (Fortune’s) overrides another 
(Cresseid’s), but Fortune’s pleasure has the puzzling effect of somehow absolving 
Cresseid of that “gilt” so firmly attributed to her earlier through such damning 
phrases as “takand thy foull pleasaunce.”
The shift from changeable or sliding “corage” to “brukkilnes” points to a hard­
ening of Cresseid’s weakness and reactions to it, a hardness that Henryson wants 
both to invent and distance himself from. The ironies intensify and proliferate: Hen­
ryson’s discarding of Chaucer’s account for “ane-uther” (61) consorts uneasily with 
Diomeid’s rejection of Cresseid for “ane-uther” (73), and one is given cause to 
wonder whether the result is preferable in either case, and for whom. From relying 
on literary invention, Henryson moves on through the alternating current of praise 
and censure to the key idea of translation. The series of impending reversals of for­
tune is captured in a particularly ironic, proleptic line of Cresseid’s solitary railing 
against the gods of love: “And all in cair tramlatit is my joy” (160, emphasis added). 
Her bitterness emerges in a passive construction designed to keep responsibility at 
bay while directing self-pity to the completeness (cleanness) of her exclusion from 
the protection of “Diomeid and noble Troylus” (132). But her misery is as yet far 
from complete, and must itself await divine translation. Only too soon, the gods will 
translate her accusation against two of their own as unforgivable blasphemy and 
offer a more detailed interpretation of her conduct in the painstakingly privative 
blazon delivered by the transforming rod and sentence of Saturn, the ruthlessly spe­
cific “bill” read by Cynthia. The combined judgments of the highest and lowest gods 
implicate the other deities in a unanimous judgment in their own favour, a judgment 
somehow both “wraikfulP and “diffinityve.” Their solidarity contrasts only too tren­
chantly with the pitiful isolation of Cresseid.
Cresseid’s attempt to “returne” her sexual vagaries on Venus and Cupid leads to 
their being returned to her with interest in the hideous disfigurements of leprosy. 
This fact she confirms when she awakes from being “Ravischit in spreit” (142), and 
checks her appearance in a mirror (348): “And quhen scho saw hir face sa deformait, 
/ Gif scho in hart was wa aneuch, God wait” (349-50). By this point, Henryson has 
both lamented the absence of grace in this judgment and insisted on its lawfulness in 
both Saturn’s words and the legal document from which Cynthia completes the 
reading and execution of the gods’ sentence.10 This episode of physical reflection has 
emotional consequences fully intelligible only to the gods but readily understandable 
in its essentials by her intimates and peers. Cresseid herself will be pushed by this 
visual translation into remorse and into becoming, in the course of her complaint, 
herself a “mirrour” (457) for “ladyis fair of Troy and Grece” (452). In a carefully 
crafted reflexive series, she has gone from being the visage in which men can read 
their own power and ambition reflected, to the first and most knowledgeable human 
witness of her new deformity, to an unwelcome reminder to a self-regarding father 
of his misfortune in living to see such a change in his daughter (375), and then even 
to an admonitory mirror for her sex of the constraints on sexual agency and assertive 
selfhood. In so moving, Cresseid will bring herself to internalise fully the “brukkil- 
nes” attributed to her earlier (86): “Becaus I knaw the greit unstabilnes, / Brukkil as 
glas, into myself, I say, / Traisting in uther als great unfaithfiilnes” (568-70, emphasis 
added). However, this coming to rest in personal accountability implies the need for 
others to do, not otherwise, but likewise. And this includes the practitioners'and 
interpreters of literary authority and invention, whoever they may be, and whatever 
their gender.
Coda
What do I think are the main implications of reading Troilus and the current con­
texts of the literary humanities in Canada? First, I would point to the need for spe­
cialists and generalists (and we all can be both, to some degree) to show common 
cause in defending the labour-intensive specificities of humanities teaching and 
scholarship. For this to happen, intensive study of whole works in careful detail must 
continue to occur, but this ought to be supplemented by an equally valued teaching 
of important issues such as gender politics and cultural imperialism through strategic 
gatherings of textual fragments and slivers. I am not suggesting a relation between
introductory and advanced study of samplings, then wholes, but specialist and gener­
alist study that is always both introductory and advanced, focused and scattered, 
though in different ways. What I have in mind entails a double gesture towards the 
canon, both revering it and roughing it up. And this double gesture should be 
haunted but not intimidated by the double spectres o f dehistoricising theory and 
chronological determinism.
Always medievalise, yes! But do so beyond the specialist fiefdom as well as 
within it. Medievalise, then, in a way that constandy reconstitutes relevance and util­
ity rather than denying or disdaining them a priori. This means teaching both struc­
ture and agency, and recognising reading and teaching as themselves staging the 
tensions between those two categories. Learning to love learning, and learning to 
love literature, are inescapably implicated in the understanding of love as such and its 
asymmetrical impositions of fidelity. That reality requires and rewards passing and 
backhanded compliments across the curriculum as well as fullblown courtship in situ. 
Otherwise, if medievalists and other specialists are urged or even forbidden “to go 
amang the [buikis] air and lait,” then all traditionalist or aggrieved talk of standards 
will also be affirming double standards of an only-too-venerable sort. All talk of 
purity will remain implicated in value structures shrewdly though sexistically cap­
tured by Marx in one of his many translations of the bonds connecting authority and 
invention: “However long a series of periodic reproductions and preceding accumu­
lations the capital functioning today may have passed through, it always preserves its 
original virginity [seine ursprungliche Jutyffraulichkeit]” (733). To promise Troilus 
but deliver Cresseid otherwise, as I have done here, was designed to make that very 
point.
University of Saskatchewan 
Notes
1 For a more detailed account of the tensions within and external resistances to 
a revival of Scottish literary studies, see R.D.S. Jack’s introduction to the Mercat 
Anthology.
2 For a lucid and compelling presentation of the case for such claims, and the 
demonstration of the pertinence of recent theory to the understanding of the 
Hebrew Bible, see David Jobling, especially his opening chapter.
3 For an endlessly suggestive—and alarming—investigation of the role of 
brand-names in constructing and managing culture, including academic culture, see 
the pioneering study by Rosemary J. Coombe.
4 In early June 1998, at a Breakfast on the Campus of Ottawa University organ­
ised as part of the public outreach of the new Congress of Learned Societies of Can­
ada, the television journalist Ann Medina of the History Channel made a crucial 
humanist point with great directness. Referring to her graduate and undergraduate 
education in philosophy, she said that the focus on large and intractable questions 
had made her patient and undeterred when faced with obduracy and evil in locations 
around the world. What better preparation for the hubris of experts and the endless 
unpredictability of life, she asked, than serious study of humanities disciplines? Noth­
ing could be more practical in its resolute linking of human accomplishment to 
human limitation.
5 Antonelli follows the English translation of the Roman de Troie in N. R. Have- 
ley with slight modifications. Haveley follows R.K. Gordon’s rendering of the cru­
cial line about Briseis’ constancy.
6 Here I follow for convenience G.C. Macaulay’s 1895 italicising of borrowings 
from Benoît.
7 For effective recent work on the complex gender politics of Chaucer’s poem, 
see, for example, Blamires, Margherita, and Stanbury.
8 See Budra and Schellenberg for a much needed and highly suggestive set-of 
explorations of the temporal, repetitive, and defective components of common con­
structions of the sequel. For Henryson’s poem as “an interpolation between lines 
1804 and 1805 of Book five of Chaucer’s poem,” see Storm, “The Intertextual 
Cressida,” p. 111.
9 The problem of accountability does not disappear if one aligns the poet’s 
inventiveness with Mercury’s (244-5). I therefore think Jill Mann too generous in 
discerning here an “adroit blandness” and “a humility before his creation” which 
Henryson shares with Chaucer (pp. 101-102).
10 For a fine account of the specifically testamentary textuality of Henryson’s 
poem, see Julia Boffey.
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